Complex Parts, Complex Data:

Why You Need to Understand What Radiation Single Event Testing Data Does and Doesn't Show and the Implications Thereof

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Acronyms

- Brookhaven National Laboratories (BNL)
- commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS)
- device under test (DUT)
- Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- field programmable gate array (FPGA)
- integrated circuits (ICs)
- intellectual property (IP)
- Joint Electron Devices Council (JEDEC)
- Joint Test Action Group JTAG 1149.1 (JTAG)
- power-on-reset (POR)
- Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW)
- single event burnout (SEB)
- single event effects (SEE)
- single event functional interrupt (SEFI)
- single event transient (SET)
- Single Event Upset Test Facility (SEUTF)
- single-event latch-up (SEL)
- test access port (TAP)
- windowed shift register (WSR)

Outline

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

Abstract

- Electronic parts (integrated circuits) have grown in complexity such that determining all failure modes and risks from single particle event testing is impossible.
- In this presentation, the authors will present why this is so and provide some realism on what this means.

It's all about understanding actual risks and not making assumptions.

Introduction

- **Device complexity has increased the challenges related to radiation single event effects (SEE) testing.**
  - **Obtaining appropriate test coverage and understanding of the response of billion-transistor commercial devices, for example, are a concern for every tester.**
    - **This is akin to test vector coverage – have we stimulated sufficient nodes (or states) during our SEE test to understand risk properly?**
- **We present three tenets for SEE testing to consider:**
  - **Tenet 1: All SEE test data are "good" data;**
  - **Tenet 2: Not all test sets/methods are appropriate or complete; and,**
  - **Tenet 3: Not all interpretation and analysis of SEE data are accurate.**
- **Each of these tenets will be discussed in turn with two related technical diatribes included.**

Diatribe 1: SEFIs – Definitions

- JEDEC JESD89A* Definition
  - "A soft error that causes the component to reset, lock-up, or otherwise malfunction in a detectable way, but does not require power cycling of the device (off and back on) to restore operability, unlike single-event latch-up (SEL), or result in permanent damage as in single event burnout (SEB)."
    - An example is an SEU in a control register changing operational modes of a device.
- Modern integrated circuits (ICs) are not that straightforward (see next chart)

*Joint Electron Devices Council (JEDEC) -
Measurement and Reporting of Alpha Particle and
Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices
(note: soft errors are terrestrial version of single event upsets (SEUs))

Diatribe 1 – SEFIs?

- **Are these SEFIs?**
  - **An SEU in hidden circuitry**
    - **May not change apparent device operation, but is observed via changes in power consumption (power cycle may be required to recover),**
  - **A single event transient (SET) in a power-on-reset (POR) circuit that power cycles/resets the device**
    - **Problem clears itself, but there is down time and to-be-determined operating state after recovery,**
  - **An SEU that latches in a redundant (weak or flawed) row/column in a memory array**
    - **May not be recoverable by power reset, or**
  - **An SEU in a security block**
    - **Device may continue working, but user's ability to change modes may be disabled.**
- **We'd say YES!**

Diatribe 1: SEFI – The Term

- Originally coined in the mid-1990s by Gary Swift (then at Jet Propulsion Laboratories) to describe a class of single event upsets (SEUs) (or a propagated SET) that causes a functional "hiccup" to occur and may be "soft" (can be cleared be reprogramming, restarting, or other non-power cycling means) or "hard" (requires power cycle).
  - Operational changes would be included as well as those "non-operational" changes like current creep.
  - This is a more general description than the JEDEC definition.

A SEFI Example (1)

- The figure below illustrates a step load increase in the power consumption (supply current) that occurred during an SEU test on a field programmable gate array (FPGA) device (Katz, et al).
  - Single event latchup (SEL) is often assumed when power increased as observed.
  - Device configuration also was altered during the event.



A SEFI Example (2)

- **SEU event was associated with the built in test circuit (Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Joint Test Action Group JTAG 1149.1 (JTAG) Test Access Port (TAP) controller as illustrated below.**



Shift Register is **undefined** in Test-LOGIC-RESET State

A SEFI Example (3)

- The bottom line is that the observational line between a SEFI and SEL can be very blurry.
- Without a true understanding of the device’s operation (for both that which is accessible to the user and that which isn’t) as well as a maximization of visibility by the test set/method, understanding and classifying an event may be problematic.

Tenet 1: The Data are Always “Good”

- In short, data is just data.
  - It is what was observed and captured during an SEE test.
  - Now the question becomes are the data captured complete, appropriate, and interpreted correctly?
- Think of the questions this brings into play:
  - Have all data points been captured? (adequate and reliable data capture),
  - Was the test prognostic enough to gather the right range of data (think of the simple SET capture from an operational amplifier – was the minimum pulse width/amplitude sensitivity of your oscilloscope set appropriately)? (appropriate test set granularity); or,
  - Have all the right test vehicles been used to generate that data? (adequate test circuits/operation)

The point is simple: the data are correct, but there’s either not enough of it or insufficient granularity of information.

The simple takeaway is that testing requires a look far below the surface…

Tenet 2: The Test (1)

- The first complication comes from the way the device under test (DUT) is tested and the way data capture was performed.
- The general idea is to focus on prognostic testing – ensuring that your test design is inquisitive enough to capture all available information on an event.
- We will define design *visibility* as ensuring that the interface between what the DUT is doing and how the test system is operating is adequate to capture all relevant event information.

Tenet 2: The Test (2)

- While this presentation isn’t a “how-to-test” document, it does recommend a thought process on what needs to be thoroughly considered in advance of test.
- An example would be having a high-speed logic string, such as a shift register, with inadequate output buffer performance that limits operation to 10% of the frequency capability.
  - In a case like this, choice of output buffer type along with a concept such as a windowed shift register (WSR) approach [Berg, et al] would allow for a proper operation and data capture.
- Bottom line: know how the testing was done and the level of completeness and granularity of data captured.

Tenet 3: The Analysis

- **The real output of any SEE test campaign is not only the ability to determine rates for space usage, but also the error signatures of the events.**
- **This is the key to understanding the risk beyond the SEE rates and to provide the system designers the information to properly design mitigation or fault tolerance approaches.**
- **The simple way of viewing this is that all SEU events that cause SEFIs are not created equal:**
  - **They have different circuit responses and capturing and diagnosing them can be a challenge.**
  - **One SEFI may change the operating mode, while another may cause a current increase.**

Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (1)

- **The theory is pretty straightforward:**
  - **Just because an event is not observed during a SEE test run doesn’t rule out the potential that the next particle will cause the event (or a different event).**
- **SEE is known to be a Markov process in that past performance is not necessarily an indicator what happens next.**
  - **One then assumes that the next particle will cause an event.**
  - **The *limiting cross-section* is then usually designated as 1/(fluence of the test run, i.e., the total number of particles/cm^2 accumulated during that run).**

Diatribe 2: Limiting cross-sections (2)

- A simple example was documented in 1998 by LaBel, et al.
  - Proton SEE tests were performed with a sample size of 3 and a proton test fluence of 1×10^{10} p/cm^2
  - A specific SEFI condition was not observed (row/column errors).
  - The project utilizing this device did not understand that this implied a *limiting cross-section*, as opposed to a zero cross-section or immunity to the effect.
  - They flew 1000 samples of this device and observed this SEFI in flight.
  - A re-test with 100 parts and a higher proton fluence confirmed this rare event and device sensitivity.

In cases of billion transistor devices, the probability of stimulating all possible error signatures is statistically zero for a typical test campaign. Thus, the best we can try to do is provide the limits for other error types not observed

Caveat Emptor!

- The figure below is from the 1992 IEEE Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) record (LaBel, et al.)
- To summarize what was presented,
  - A system level test of an INTEL 80386 processor and several peripherals was performed at Brookhaven National Laboratories (BNL) Single Event Upset Test Facility (SEUTF).
  - The data were for a representative test run and interpreted as “microlatchup” – a series of SEL events that caused a step-like increase with each event in the power supply current consumption.
  - However, the device continued to function during the test run even with the increases.



Mea Culpa!

- Realistically, more diagnostics were needed to determine if these really were SEL events and not possibly caused by SEU hits to hidden logic or bus contention or another SEFI event.
- Even over twenty years ago, device complexity and understanding should have been better explored.



Discussion

- **The realistic implications are different depending on whether the device is commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) or custom-designed for radiation tolerance..**
  - **For COTS, you will be dealing with unknowns and limitations, hence capturing as many error signatures as possible provides the most useful information.**
    - **It's what the designers need to build appropriate mitigation into their systems.**
  - **For custom design, you should be able to predict error signatures as long as there aren't intellectual property (IP) blocks of unknown design (black box designs).**
    - **Thus, tests here are usually more about statistics to meet SEU rates or threshold levels.**
    - **That is, unless unexpected SEFI events occur.**
- **Devices like FPGAs are afflicted with both implications:**
  - **Custom designs are created, but there's also manufacturer-embedded IP and hidden functions that require detailed error signature capture.**
  - ***Double the challenge*!**

Summary

- While far from a complete treatise on testing, we have provided some caveats in reviewing a device’s SEE performance based on collected data.
- The level of understanding of the device’s internal workings as well as the limitations of the test setup, allow proper risk-based analyses to be performed on the collected SEE data.
  - It’s not just event rates, but event signatures and interpretation!

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